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Abstract: I argue that the same factors (strategic and principled) that motivated
Catholicism to champion liberal democracy are the same that motivate 21st Century Islam
to do the same. I defend this claim by linking political liberalism to democratic secularism.
Distinguishing institutional, political, and epistemic dimensions of democratic secularism, I
show that moderate forms of political and epistemic secularism are most conducive to
fostering the kind of public reasoning essential to democratic legitimacy. This
demonstration draws upon the ambivalent impact of Indonesia’s Islamic parties in
advancing universal social justice aims as against more sectarian policies.

Thirty years ago Edward Said's iconic treatise on orientalism indicted Western imperialism and
its academic apologists for having deployed the ideology of cultural differences in depicting
Arab-Islamic culture as inherently despotic, backward, and antithetical to secular Occidental
culture.1 This orientalist ideology has continued to persist among those who find in Christendom
and Islam new enemies to replace the ideological adversaries of the Cold War.2 As Bryan Turner
remarks,3 this new ideological opposition between a rationalized Christendom and a premodern
Islam is deeply problematic at a number of levels: both religious worldviews share common
Abrahamic origins and values; Islam established itself as an Occidental society in Spain, Malta,
and the Balkans; and Islam preserved, developed, and disseminated the intellectual legacy of
classical Greece that formed the identity of Christendom and Occidental rationality.
For Turner, the global conflict facing us today is not ideological but social and
economic. The spread of “postmodern” global capitalism with its commodification of culture,
undermining of communitarian identities, and reduction of persons to individually self-centered
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E. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
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Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (New
York: Harper Collins, 2002).

B. Turner, Orientalism, Postmodernism, and Globalism (London: Routledge, 1994).
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consumers has provoked a religious backlash that is felt as much by Christian fundamentalists as
by Islamic fundamentalists. Although it pushes against an excessively materialistic form of
secularism, this backlash also targets an idealistic variant: multiculturalism. Multiculturalism
undermines fundamentalism's nostalgic yearning for certain and stable identities. Although many
fundamentalists respond to this threat by withdrawing from civil society, others instead respond
by projecting their desire onto the democratic state. Rejecting liberal and pluralistic ideals of
self-limiting democratic compromise, they envision the totalitarian suppression or subordination
of competing identities as a way of legally and politically cementing their own.
This apparent hostility to secularism, pluralism, and democratic compromise, however, is
belied by a further idealistic component within the Islamic/Christian imaginary: a transcendent
commitment to social justice. Political opposition to postmodern capitalism's stratifying
dynamic, which contradicts the holy command to combat material oppression on this earth,
strongly encourages religious fundamentalists to pursue a secular agenda whose broad scope and
success requires a modest – and I will argue reasonable – acceptance of self-limiting compromise
and political argumentation. Secular commitment to a political value that is universal and thus
free-standing with respect to religion and every comprehensive ideological orientation – social
justice for believer and non-believer alike – converges with a form of political liberalism that
demands multicultural toleration of all reasonable comprehensive doctrines (religious and
secular) to the extent that these doctrines overlap in supporting the political value in question.
In making this argument, I will draw upon on an analogy between the trajectory that some
moderate Islamist parties in Indonesia have taken in furthering secular democracy in the name of
social justice, and that taken by Catholicism, whose antagonism toward liberalism and secular
democracy, having reached their apogee over a hundred years ago, is perhaps less well known.
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Catholicism largely overcame its hostility to secular democracy and became a major force for
advancing democracy in the last three decades of the 20th Century. I maintain that the factors that
led political Catholicism along this trajectory are also at work in some varieties of political
Islam.
Addressing both Catholic and Islamic strands of religious politics along with their
ambivalent relationship to secular democracy, I believe, shows us that religious politics and
secular democracy shape each other, as both in turn respond to deeper socio-economic changes
in their environment. However, defending the compatibility of religious politics and secular
democracy will require drawing some rather fine-grained distinctions, not only between different
kinds of religious politics but also between different kinds (and aspects) of secular democracy.
When speaking of secular democracy political scientists normally focus on the institutional
separation of religion and state. Equally important, however, is the political culture; viz., the
degree of democratic toleration and civility religious political parties display in furthering their
aims. Closely connected to this political secularism is an epistemic secularism, or the capacity, as
Rawls puts it, for religious parties to accept the “burdens of judgment” in refraining from
imposing religious doctrines or appealing to religious rationales whose truth cannot in principle
be demonstrated to all. While it may seem that extreme epistemic secularism correlates with
political secularism, I shall argue that religion is sometimes a better stimulus to creating and
preserving secular democracy.
I begin (Part One) by examining the problem of secularism in the Muslim world. I argue
that Islamic thought and practice reveal a spectrum of epistemic, political, and institutional
forms, some more secular than others. In the second half of the 20th Century, reaction against
Western secularism led many Muslim countries to adopt hybrid institutional forms, involving
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dual (religious/secular) jurisdictions and dual systems of legitimation and administration. Despite
their hybridity, such forms arguably meet a threshold of democratic secularity.
Politically speaking, however, Islamist support for blasphemy laws and other policies
reflecting Islamic doctrine (as in Indonesia) raise a different set of questions about the
compatibility of political Islam and secular politics. I continue (Part Two) by examining these
questions within the context of debates about religion-based limitations on free expression
(obscenity) in the United States and secular limitations on free religious expression in France.
Comparing French and American paradigms of religion-state separation (or hybridity) as
representative of strong and moderate paradigms of political secularism, I contend that neither
paradigm presents a religion-neutral interpretation of what counts as a reasonable inclusion of
humanistic or religious expressions in the public sphere. Drawing on Charles Taylor's normative
criteria of secular democracy, I argue that strongly secularist democracies such as those
institutionalized in France and Turkey fail to balance the criterion of fraternity against criteria of
freedom, equality, and public inclusion.
Concluding that standards of reasonable inclusion must be negotiated in the public
political sphere as suggested by the more moderate, American paradigm of secularism, I turn
(Part Three) to the problem of specifying the precise moral limits of such negotiation. Drawing
from Muslim as well as Catholic and agnostic thinkers, I argue that “public reason” cannot be
interpreted as peremptorily excluding comprehensive faith commitments from its purview,
although such commitments must conform to the moral requirements of secular democratic
debate in order to claim legitimacy.
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In answering why we should expect religious political movements to evolve from
strategically motivated, qualified acceptance of these requirements (modus vivendi) to
unqualified acceptance based on moral principles, I argue (Part Four) that the social justice
concerns of religious political movements lead these movements to broaden their appeal beyond
narrow doctrinaire platforms. This conclusion is further supported by comparing the role that
Islamic movements played in Indonesia’s peaceful transition to secular democracy to the role
that Catholic movements played in the “third wave” of democratic reform in Europe and South
America.

Part One: Secularism in the Muslim World: Epistemic, Institutional, and Political Aspects

In 2013 five girls were charged with having violated Indonesia’s blasphemy law (Article 156a of
Indonesia’s penal code) that prohibits “staining religion, adhered to in Indonesia . . . with the
intention to prevent a person to adhere to any religion based on the belief in the almighty God.”
Specifically, the girls shot a video of themselves dancing to a pop song while reciting prayers
from the Qur’an. They face up to five years in juvenile detention if convicted. In an earlier
(2010) case involving the free exercise of religion, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court rejected a
challenge to the blasphemy law, noting that prohibiting expression of religious beliefs that
deviate from the central tenets of any one of Indonesia’s six officially recognized religions was
necessary for protecting public safety and order. (In 2008 officials invoked the law to suppress
the religious practices of the Ahmadiya, who believe Mohammad will be followed by another
prophet, after members of the National Alliance for the Freedom of Faith and Religion who had
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peacefully demonstrated on behalf of religious pluralism were attacked by 500 Islamist
militants.) Four months prior to the court decision, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had
opened the Sixth Assembly of the World Movement for Democracy by proclaiming: “We in
Indonesia have shown, by example, that Islam, democracy, and modernity can grow together. We
are a living example that there is no conflict between a Muslim spiritual obligation to Allah (and)
his civic responsibility as a citizen in a pluralist society” (my stress).
Human Rights Watch disagreed with this assessment, condemning the court’s 2010
decision as a stark endorsement of religious intolerance.4 Hence the question: Who is right –
Human Rights Watch or the President and the court? Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution guarantees
freedom of religion in Article 28e and in 2006 Indonesia ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees that members of religious minorities “shall not be
denied the right, in community with other members of their group . . . to profess and practice
their own religion.” So either the blasphemy law contradicts Indonesia’s constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom and its international legal obligations or it qualifies this civil and political
right in ways that are compatible with citizenship in a secular democracy.
The same question can be asked about the law’s prohibition against “tainting religion.” Is
this prohibition less problematic because it targets all disrespectful displays of religion regardless
of denomination? Or does it too violate a basic civil and political right to free expression? In
general, if delimiting the range of free expression of religion as it applies in this instance and in
cases involving the toleration of minority confessions requires reasonably balancing conflicting
“Indonesia: Court Ruling a Set Back for Religious Freedom,”
(http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/04/19/Indonesia).
4
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values (freedom versus public order, fraternal pluralism versus majoritarian democracy), then to
which cultural and political standards of reasonableness should one appeal?
To probe this question more deeply we need to understand how the secular conditions of
modern pluralism and democratic civic responsibility mentioned by President Yudhoyono are not
in conflict with (as he puts it) “a spiritual obligation to Allah.” The secular conditions of modern
pluralism and democratic civic responsibility are institutional, political, and epistemic, with each
of these terms referring to a limitation on the absolute and all-encompassing authority of religion
vis-à-vis worldly matters. Simplifying further, I distinguish between strong, moderate, and weak
forms of secularism.
Strong epistemic secularism (SES): Reduction of knowledge to what can be confirmed
using scientific methods (positivism). Corresponding to methodological positivism is
skepticism about the meaningfulness or truth of non-factual value judgments and
religious revelations.
Weak epistemic secularism (WES): Recognition of scientific knowledge and religious
revelation as distinct sources of knowledge. As in the case of science, where one
paradigm is recognized as factually authoritative, one religion is privileged as the sole
true paradigm of values and norms. Stronger WES recognizes a plurality of authoritative
religions.
Moderate epistemic secularism (MES): Recognition of the complementarity of science
and religion and the interpenetration of facts and values. MES acknowledges both
utilitarian calculations and rational consensus among comprehensive belief systems as
worldly sources of moral knowledge. MES views religion as a primary source for secular
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values revolving around the fundamental dignity of the individual and the common good,
and rejects extreme forms of materialistic humanism (psychological and moral egoism)
as well as scientific positivism as reductionist ideologies. MES condemns value
skepticism and radical relativism while treating all knowledge as value-laden,
interpretative, contextual, and fallible.
Strong institutional secularism (SIS): State suppresses public expression of religion as
incompatible with a national “civic religion.” Suppression ranges in strength from
institutional atheism (as in the former USSR and its client states) to institutional laicism
(as in present-day France and Turkey).
Weak institutional secularism (WIS): Within a pluralist framework permitting freedom
of thought and religion, state privileges one religion (confessional state) or perhaps
several religions. Weaker forms expressly derive some or all constitutional rights, duties,
and norms from a privileged religion (or religions).
Moderate institutional secularism (MIS): Constitutional separation of religion and state
compatible with some state involvement in religion. Separation is compatible with dual
jurisdictions delegating some areas of private law arbitration to religious courts (as in
India and some Muslim majority countries).
Strong political secularism (SPS): Citizens and political parties bracket religious motives
and values when voting or advocating on behalf of policies.
Weak political secularism (WPS): Citizens and political parties mainly appeal to
religious motives and values when voting or advocating on behalf of policies.
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Moderate political secularism (MPS): Citizens and political parties interpret their
religious motives and values in conformity with broadly shared secular values and norms.
Citizens and political parties recognize and value religious pluralism and refrain from
imposing religiously motivated policies that cannot be justified on non-religious grounds.
Explanation: Essential to all forms of secularism is a separation, partial or complete, of religion
from worldly knowledge, law, and politics. Although one might suppose that strong, weak, and
moderate forms of secularism tend to correlate across categories, I do not provide evidence for
this. Polities characterized by WPS (Iraq) or SES (Germany) might both endorse MIS. Further
complicating this picture is the anomalous nature of SIS and WIS as descriptors that apply
equally to ideological regimes of a nationalist or civic humanist stripe.
The above analysis articulates the multidimensional relationship between Islam and
secular democracy in a way that links epistemic and political competencies. Turning first to the
epistemic dimension of the relationship, we note that two Arabic words for secularism,
almaniyya and ilmanniyya, have as their roots alam (worldliness) and ilm (scientific knowledge).
These two concepts are touched upon in at least one sacred Muslim text. One chapter of the
Sahih of Imam Muslim, the second most authentic book on Hadith, dating back to the Second
Century Hijrah, is entitled: “Whatever the Prophet has said in matters of religion must be
followed, but this does not apply to worldly affairs.”
Although centuries of Islamic secular philosophy and science dating back to Averroes
understand this hadith as endorsing MES, it bears remembering that some Islamic thinkers in the
modern era, like their Catholic counterparts during the Renaissance, equated the Western
enlightenment with SES. Both Islam and Catholicism had to confront the challenge of modern
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science, but Muslims living under colonial rule and in modernizing Middle Eastern states
premised on SIS witnessed their traditional madrasas and religion-based educational traditions
suppressed and replaced by public schools that were perceived as enforcing SES. Subsequent
reaction against this Westernizing influence produced hostility towards more moderate forms of
institutional secularism.
Turning to the institutional aspect of secularism, scholars in Muslim countries have long
debated whether and to what extent political and legal systems fall into the spiritual realm of
moral and ethical regulation or the worldly realm of scientific administration and rational choice.
Those scholars, who argue that the “spiritual” domain regulated by the Qur’an and Hadith
extends to the political and social realm, will find little in these texts pertaining to the structure of
a just state, as distinct from the structure of a just society.5 Some scholars, including noted
political theorist Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, insist that provisions of shari’a based exclusively
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Some scholars have argued that the different way in which Christian and Muslim theologians
working within a reason-based, natural law context have traditionally interpreted human nature –
divided (sinful) versus undivided - seems to correlate with opposing views of legal authority,
with Islam favoring less divided forms of government that would be less amenable to separation
of religion and state. Indeed, some scholars have made the more sweeping claim that Islam, or
Muslim culture broadly construed, seems less accepting of social conflict as a necessary and
unavoidable – and perhaps even positive – feature of modern political life. From this shaky
premise they conclude that in cases of conflict any rational interpretation of shari’a that takes into
account its four sources – the Qur’an, hadith, consensus, and analogical reasoning - will privilege
the common good over individual rights, including, as we saw in the case of Indonesia, the civil
rights of religious minorities. See R. Powell, “Toward Reconciliation in the Middle East: A
Framework for Muslim-Christian Dialog Using Natural Law Tradition,” Loyola University
Chicago International Law Review, v. 2, n.1 (2004).
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on a literalist reading of the Qur’an and Hadith are problematic in that they subordinate women
to men, deny non-Muslims full civil and political rights and require them to pay a special tax,
and condemn Muslims who abandon their faith. These provisions, when legally imposed, appear
to violate human rights, at least insofar as these rights are fully understood to apply to all
individuals equally, pursuant to Articles 1-3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948). 6
However, An-Na'im also argues that an interpretation of the Qur’an, based on the early
Mecca teachings of Mohammad, before the flight to Medina and the establishment of a Muslim
state, permits accommodation with liberal human rights, gender equality and democratic ideals,
and even requires the religious neutrality of the state (quoting Surah 256 of the Qur’an, which
commands that “there shall be no compulsion in religion”). Historically, in fact, the four Caliphs
that followed Mohammad were chosen by the community of converts (umma) as spiritual
interpreters of shari’a based on their personal association with him, but they were not
administrators of a coercive state apparatus in the full sense of the word. Concluding that these
caliphates did not amount to a fusion of state and religion, Ira Lapidus adds that later dynastic
rulers of the Ummayyad (661-750), Abbasid (750-1258), Mameluke (1250-1517) and Ottoman empires
(1299-1922) were state administrators who, however, instituted a divided government along the

6

A. A. An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), p. 21; and Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the
Future of Shari’a (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). But as Alessandro Ferrara notes (The
Democratic Horizon: Hyper-Pluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), ch. 5), in Muslim contexts individual rights are typically invoked in a restorative
manner, as compensations for torts and damages, rather than as “natural properties” of persons that serve
to delimit state power and “trump” duties to the community.
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lines of the doctrine of two swords that prevailed in Medieval Christendom, which conceded
distinct domains of legal jurisdiction to secular and religious authorities.7 The Sultans and Emirs
did protect the Muslim faith from internal and external enemies and they sought to institute
shari’a but, as Olivier Roy observes, they derived most of their legitimacy from their political
and administrative functions, such as the power to coin money and preserve order.8
Today, many majority-Muslim governments that have secular constitutions permit
Muslims to settle family and property disputes in shari’a courts. Others that constitutionally
entrench shari’a as a system of higher legitimating values and principles (such as Iraq and
Pakistan) institute secular forms of democratic governance legitimating legislation and public
law adjudication. Again, in the wake of the recent Arab Spring uprising, Tunisia’s 2014
Constitution entrenches Islamic values (Article 1) while guaranteeing full and equal religious
freedom for all (Article 6). In the case of Indonesia, we find yet another variety of this example
of religious legitimation of secular democracy, expressed in the non-sectarian principle of
pancasila (see below). Hence we may describe these institutional arrangements as lying
somewhere between WIS and MIS.
The manner in which shari’a has been institutionalized in the legal and political
institutions of majority-Muslim states today has been shaped by Islamist political movements
that arose in reaction to home-grown and foreign- imposed secular governments. Many of these
7

Ira M. Lapidus, "The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society",
International Journal of Middle East Studies vol. 6, no 4 (October 1975): 364.

8

Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994, 14-15.
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governments were deemed to be hostile to the moral and social justice precepts of Islam. Some
of them, such as Gamar Abdel Nasser’s in Egypt, were inspired by Arab nationalism and
socialism, and so regarded Islamists as a divisive force that needed to be repressed. Indeed, even
Pakistan, a regime founded on Islam, has suppressed fundamentalist Islamist groups opposed to
its weakly secular form of government.
However, as noted above, most Muslims endorse some religious involvement in politics
and so reject the banishment of religion from the public sphere that once existed in Iran (under
the Pahlavi regime) and still existed in Turkey until recently. Leaving aside fundamentalists,9
many Sunni moderates derive their political commitment to democratic and human rights reform
from the 8th Century Hanifite School, whose interpretation of shari'a emphasizes the role of
analogical reasoning and rational deliberation about the common good above traditional
consensus (ijma) and textual literalness. Khalid Abou el Fadl of the Usali school of jurisprudence
is a well-known critic of Wahhabism and a defender of human rights.10 Rashed Ghannouchi, who
helped draft Tunisia’s constitution – considered to be among the most secular and politically
liberal in the Arab world – and found the moderate Ennahda Party, likewise advocates political
liberalism.
9

For a detailed discussion of Islamic fundamentalism (especially Wahhabism and the origins of

the Hanbali legal school) and its relationship to the Shafi'ite, Malakite, and Hanafi schools, see
Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991)
and Josef van Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2006.)
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Khalid Abou el Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (San Francisco: Harper, 2005).
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Shiism and branches of Sufism (which emphasizes mystical revelation) also interpret the
Qur’an this way, and the Mevlevi order, founded in thirteenth century Turkey, and the
Republican Brotherhood, founded in the twentieth century by the Sudanese scholar Mahmoud
Mohamad Taha (of which An-Na’im is a follower), especially emphasize the blending of
spiritual exercises and secular moral and political thought. A striking example of a modernizing
Shiite movement is the Iranian Reform Front, which briefly came to power under the presidency
of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005). Khatami’s call for a “dialogue of civilizations” was also a
call to come to terms with globalization and anti-Western fundamentalism in ways that resonate
with the account of democratic public reason I discuss below.11
.
As for stronger secular reform movements, the “Young Turks” who came to power
following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire illustrate a different kind of tension that can exist
between certain Western ideals of enlightenment associated with SES, SIP, and SPS and liberal
democracy. The example of Turkey also illustrates how complicated state/religion relationships
can be even in governments that have instituted a rather severe form of state/religion separation.
The Turkish Republic’s former ban on religious parties and public displays of religious
symbolism (dating back to Mustafa Kemal’s obsession with combating religious divisiveness in
the founding years of the republic) resembles the laïcism of the French Republic (see below),
even though the Religious Affairs Directory appoints imams, issues religious decrees (fatwas),
mandates religious education, and shapes curriculum according to its own flexible and rational

11

A good discussion of this singular moment in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran may be found
in Günes Tezcür, The Paradox of Moderation: Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 2010),
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adaptation of the Qur’an. The permission granted to the AK (Justice and Development) Party by
the military (the official guardians of the Turkish constitution) to form a government in 2002
marked an important step toward liberalization, since the AK’s platform, informed as it is by the
toleration characteristic of Turkish Sufism, advocates a modestly pluralistic society in which
most religious and non-religious beliefs are permitted public expression, within limits.12
Let me now conclude this section by returning to the example of Indonesia, whose
problematic blasphemy law provoked our discussion. Aside from the Iranian Revolution of 190506, whose broad public support issued in a relatively liberal and democratic constitutional
monarchy, Indonesia’s young constitutional government arguably approximates the liberal
democratic ideal more closely than any other in the Muslim world. Indonesia’s democracy
followed upon the resignation of General Suharto and his often brutal “New Order” regime that
ruled from 1965 to 1998. Like the Islamic democracy that emerged in the wake of the 1979
Iranian revolution, it reacted against an oppressive authoritarian government. Although the
government it replaced was at best weakly secular – the Suharto regime increasingly advanced
Islamic policies to divide the opposition and gather popular support - it was nonetheless
condemned by many pious Muslims for siphoning off vast amounts of wealth for its own
privileged elites while ignoring the spiritual and material needs of its poorest citizens.13

Günes Tezcür, “Constitutionalism, Judiciary, and Democracy in Islamic Societies, Polity 39/4 (October
2007), pp. 479-501. This same author notes (Paradox of Moderation, 80) that the AK has been halfhearted in its support for religious freedom for the Alevis.
12

13

Robert Hefner, His Civil Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), esp. chs, 6-7.
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Indonesians thus supported moderately secular democratic reform in direct opposition to a
corrupt and brutal dictatorship that often masqueraded as Islamist.
I shall have more to say about the positive contribution that political Islam made to this
reform in the conclusion. Suffice it to say, the reform is powerful evidence – along with the
historical sources cited at the outset of this discussion – that Islam, like most religions, represents
a complex web of epistemic, political, and institutional orientations that can accommodate a
variety of secular democratic forms. Particularly striking is the way in which these forms
incorporate religious elements. SIS regimes like Turkey combine laïcism and Islamic education;
WIS regimes like Iraq and Tunisia promote religious freedom under the aegis of shari’a. And
Indonesia’s similar constitutional provisions are officially upheld by religious principles that, as I
argue in the conclusion, cast aspersions on its blasphemy law, or at least the court’s application
of it.
However, before deciding whether that law runs afoul of these principles, and more
important, whether religious interventions in support of restricting freedom of speech might be
undertaken in a manner that is reasonable and legitimate according to at least moderate forms of
secular politics, I propose that we first look at the problem from the opposite standpoint and ask
whether secular restrictions on public religious expression (broadly construed to include visual
displays as well as speech) and other restrictions that burden the free exercise of religion violate
reasonable and legitimate forms of secular politics. A brief review of this question as it has been
debated in two opposed, iconic systems of Western democratic secularism – France and the
United States – will help us answer the broader question concerning the normative limits of
reasonable secular politics.

18

Part Two: Secular Democracy in Christendom: Preliminary Sociological Observations
In Christendom as in Islam, ‘secular’ and ‘secularization’ have multiple meanings. Although in
Christian contexts ‘secular’ roughly means ‘non-religious,’ ‘secularization’ can also connote a
process immanent within religion. Ecclesiastic usage refers to the act of releasing monks from
their vows; historical usage refers to the selling off (or confiscation) of church property. It may
also have referred to the spread of Christianity beyond the Jewish community and its assimilation
to Roman culture.
This latter meaning partly resonates with the sociological meaning of secularization,
understood as a process whereby parochial religious images, such as the Christian image of
humanity made in the likeness of God, are rationally reinterpreted as universal ideas (e.g., the
equal and inherent dignity of the individual as a bearer of human rights). It is in this latter sense
that Weber saw the ethical heritage of Abrahamic faiths as conducive to providing the cultural
foundation for modernization. That said, he believed that only Christianity – specifically
Protestantism – provided the “spiritual” conditions for realizing modernity as a distinctly
rational form of capitalist society,14 thereby relegating Islam to the status of a static premodern
worldview.15 As Turner correctly notes, this orientalist bias obscures the fundamental
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M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905).
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Weber did not live to finish his study of Islam to complement his other volumes on sociology
of world religion (1920-21): Ancient Judaism, The Religion of China, and The Religion of
India. His scattered remarks on Islam argue that “Islam was never a religion of salvation” that
could inspire worldly asceticism conducive to capitalism in the way that Christianity could.
Islam, he contended, was disseminated by warriors who sought salvation through holy war
(jihad) and territorial expansion. The feudal property system they established tolerated
slavery, serfdom, and external, ritual deference to shari'a but no internal ethical commitment
to personal responsibility. Complementing Islam's legalism, which vested the qadi with ad
hoc law creating powers in interpreting the vague and unsystematic corpus of shari'a, was an

19

ambivalence of both Islam and Christianity toward capitalism, to which these worldviews can be
at once accommodating and resistant.16
Indeed, the classical sociological tradition of Marx, Weber and Durkheim linked the
‘rationalization’ of religion to its decline. Weber, for instance, argued that rationalization
“disenchants” the cosmos and breaks apart comprehensive world views into distinct cultural
value spheres revolving around law and morality, science and technology, and art and eros.
Accompanying this pluralization of cultural spheres is a corresponding differentiation of social
structures (state, economy, and family). In tandem with this process we also observe a functional
differentiation of social and vocational roles, a pluralization of comprehensive belief systems,
and an individualization of persons’ self-understanding. 17 According to this theory of
secularization, whatever vestiges of religious faith remain are relegated to the back burner of
private moral conscience, whose unconditional moral imperatives – seemingly necessary for
under-girding the weak civil solidarity of a hyper-individualist, contractualist society - gradually

inward-looking, but mystical and otherworldly, Sufism. M. Weber, Sociology of Religion
(London Methuen, 1965), pp. 263-4.
16

Turner argues that much of Weber's explanation for Islam's failure to provide fertile ground for
capitalism – its alleged lack of inwardness and asceticism, formal systematic legal structure,
and acceptance of commerce - are faulty. The Qur'an discusses commerce in a noncondemning tone and exhorts the believer to ethical conduct conducive to ascetic salvation;
meanwhile Anglo-American common law with its judge-made case law approach parallels
qadi law in its lack of systemic unity. But Turner observes that one part of Weber's
explanation does ring true, although it is extrinsic to his discussion regarding the spirit of
Islam: patrimonial war lords destroyed a once-thriving money economy by seizing property
and land through arbitrary taxation and lawless means. B. Turner, “Islam, Capitalism, and the
Weber Thesis,” British Journal of Sociology 25/2 (1974): 230-43.
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give way to the prudential calculations of economic life. Compromising competing economic
interests now becomes the chief business of democratic politics, replacing efforts to convert
others to the true faith.
In the face of an alienated daily regimen of work and consumption, Weber also
discerned a counter-yearning for charismatic leadership and solidarity, which, as we know today,
can take modern secularist or anti-modern anti-secularist forms, inspiring either progressive
criticism of the social injustices and pathologies of capitalism or regressive nostalgia (nationalist
or fundamentalist) for lost identity and community. Iranian philosopher and moderate Islamist
Abdolkarim Soroush emphasizes the epistemic dimension of this divide: “From an
epistemological point of view, the presecular (or premodern) age is marked by the hegemony of
metaphysical thought in political, economic, and social realm,” which modernity unsettles, such
that “no values and rules are beyond human appraisal.”18
Although the decline of religion is observable in some modern (mainly European)
democracies, what is striking today in the West is the persistence and resurgence of religion
alongside moderate forms of epistemic, political, and institutional secularism. For this reason
contemporary secularization theorists such as Charles Taylor propose a more nuanced view
regarding the transformation of religion in modern society.19 Assuming that secularism does not
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destroy religion, it may lead to its privatization; but where religion continues to play a significant
role in public affairs, it can take either moderate or antagonistic forms. As we saw in the case of
moderate Islamic secularism, it can also assume a pluralization of religious forms, in which
religion co-exists alongside of, or mixes with, other non-theistic orientations in a constellation
that falls short of prescribing a fully comprehensive way of life.
Taylor extends this analysis of religious pluralism to his discussion of secular democracy.
Rejecting the standard view that democracy demands a strict separation of church and state along
the lines of SIS – a definition which, among other things, would impugn the secularity of
nominally confessional democracies such as Great Britain, Denmark and Finland - he notes
three requirements of modern pluralism (roughly corresponding to the French Revolutionary
trinity of liberty, equality, and fraternity) that such democracies must satisfy if they are to meet
the minimal criteria of MIS: they must permit the most extensive individual exercise of religious
freedom compatible with a like freedom for all; they must not privilege one religious outlook
over another; and they must include all religious outlooks in the democratic shaping of public
opinion – a feature that is the focus of my paper.20 Recognizing the danger of social conflict
posed by allowing one (or several) religions hegemonic influence in shaping public opinion (and
recalling Indonesia's suppression of the Ahmadya), Taylor recommends supplementing the third
requirement with a fourth requirement: secular democracies must balance these three goals in a
way that conduces to religious harmony.

C. Taylor, “Why We Need A Radical Redefinition of Secularism,” in The Power of Religion in the
Public Sphere, ed. E. Mendieta and J. Vanantwerpen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp.
34-5.
20
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Taylor illustrates how these requirements evolved out of two divergent strands of Western
secular democracy: French and American. More so than its Turkish counterpart, French
secularism was born out of a reaction against religion; it sought to build a democratic ethos
opposed to the authoritarian monarchism of the Catholic Church. Hence it sought to regulate all
public religious expression that might be divisive in this regard. By contrast, American
secularism was nurtured in a religiously diverse culture of Protestant and Deist worldviews that
displayed far greater acceptance of democratic values. Because the Founders perceived religious
intolerance, not religious hegemony, as the greater danger to democracy, their disestablishment
of religion aimed mainly at ensuring its free exercise.
The history of American First Amendment jurisprudence illustrates the enduring tension
between disestablishing religion and permitting its free exercise. On one hand, the on-going
debate over obscenity laws – and the court's unwillingness to uphold anti-pornography
ordinances that threaten political expression – shows that the court is conflicted about prohibiting
forms of speech that may be offensive to religion-imbued community standards. On the other
hand, by opposing state-imposed burdens on the exercise of religion (e.g., requiring parochial
schools to meet certain academic standards) the courts have granted religious institutions free
access to publicly funded services (e.g., special education for students with learning disabilities)
and have permitted public funding for religion-based anti-drug counseling, parochial school
vouchers, and modest official displays of religious observance.21
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This history also illustrates how the inclusion of non-Protestant Christians, Jews, nonbelievers, and more recently, Native Americans,22 under First Amendment protection began only
in response to challenges posed by Catholic and Jewish immigrants at the beginning of the
twentieth century. The pluralization of religious factions propelled the drive toward inclusion,
thereby confirming James Madison’s view in Federalist Papers #51 that fighting religious
intolerance could be checked through securing a strategic balance of power between opposed
factions. Madison's hope was that such a shifting modus vivendi would evolve into a principled
compromise in which the desire among factions to impose their religion would be eclipsed by a
universal recognition that no confession has an exclusive monopoly on the truth. Civic virtue
and civility should disarm antagonism and engender true religious harmony based on shared
devotion to justice and the common good.
Were he alive today, Madison might have faulted American courts for invoking technical
legal theory to resolve America's on-going debate over whether secular humanism or theism
should be privileged in interpreting freedom of religion and freedom of expression instead of
allowing the people’s representatives to decide this matter on their own. But as the French
example shows, letting the people's representatives decide these matters need not guarantee a just
and reasonable resolution; indeed, judging from the lively debate over prohibiting Muslim
women from wearing the burqa in public spaces and Muslim girls from wearing the hijab in
public schools, it is far from evident that the French people have properly balancing Taylor's
requirements of religious freedom, equality, and non-hegemony against the competing
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requirement of religious fraternity, as interpreted by the hegemonic discourse of France's
aggressively humanistic (or nationalistic) civil religion.23

Part Three: Civil Discourse and Public Reason in Secular Democracy

One might question whether the United States as a moderately secular polity or France as a more
strongly secular polity has properly balanced religious freedom and religious disestablishment,
which returns us to the controversy over Indonesia’s blasphemy law. While human rights
activists have criticized the law, my brief reference to American Constitutional practice as
reflecting, in Madisonian terms, an evolving political compromise suggests that no standard of
public reasonableness is completely neutral vis-à-vis competing values (be they secular or
religious). Recall that religious sentiment based on monogenic theology – not primitive science
based on polygenetic anthropology (propagated by Agassez, Morton, and Nott) - upheld the
equal humanity of African slaves during the American abolitionist debate. The fact that antiblasphemy statutes descend from religion makes them no less reasonable than anti-obscenity
laws, which have a religious pedigree as well. Although the American law banning obscenity and
the Indonesian law banning blasphemy have different references (targeting expression that
appeals to “prurient interests” in a patently offensive way and expression that “taints religion,”
respectively), which renders blasphemy laws comparably less secular than obscenity laws, the
aim of both laws is to impose a majority’s religious mores on a typically less religiously inclined
23
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minority. Failure to demonstrate the harmfulness of blasphemy and obscenity will not compel
those offended by these forms of expression to desist from suppressing those who engage in
them unless it can be shown that suppression is more harmful than toleration. This burden of
proof, however, is easily met in most cases involving the denial of religious freedom.
Ironically, many critics of blasphemy laws insist that secular democracy requires a far
more restrictive speech code when debating and deliberating on public policy. Although few
would disparage the expression of religious convictions in bearing public witness to the rightness
or wrongness of policies, there are some who feel differently when it comes to political
expression aimed at argumentative persuasion and reasoned deliberation. Doubtless many would
agree with Taylor that including religious language in the public promulgation of laws,
judgments, and executive decrees compromises the secular neutrality of the state (although the
examples of Iraq and Pakistan noted above suggest that such language need not vitiate the
secular legitimacy of the state tout court). But is it then inappropriate for elected representatives
to appeal to religion in parliamentary debate? And, is it inappropriate for ordinary citizens to do
the same when they debate public policy with persons who do not share their religious beliefs?
These questions arise whenever we ask why minorities who dissent from majoritarian
policies have at least a prima facie duty to abide by them. The usual “you play by the rules, you
accept the outcome” response to this query presumes that everyone recognizes the fairness of the
rules. In order for the rules governing democratic politics to be fair, it is not enough that they
allow everyone an equal vote and an equal right to speak out and associate freely. These
safeguards against the worst kind of majoritarian tyranny – the violation of the minority’s basic
rights - do not address a less violent form of majoritarian “winner-take-all” tyranny. A fair
democracy must also allow the minority an equal chance to be heard and responded to in a way
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that respects its ethical standpoint (assuming that that standpoint is tolerant of other standpoints).
Losers as well as winners in democratic contests have a legitimate expectation that their
concerns have been met with arguments whose premises they find to be reasonable - arguments
whose reasons respect their own ethical standpoint even if they do not compel their assent. To
rephrase this point in the language of deliberative democracy, some effort at rationally achieving
a generally acceptable consensus on common interests, free from the constraints of hegemonic
ideology and socio-economic power, must guide the process of public will formation and
legislation in order for legal outcomes to merit the presumption of normative legitimacy
(worthiness of recognition as prima facie morally binding); and this deliberative effort, whether
successful or not in its consensual aim, cannot move forward unless citizens speak to one
another in a mutually comprehensible and respectful language.
This is what John Rawls and other defenders of political liberalism have in mind when
speaking of a civil duty to hew one’s political thinking to public reason.24 Three questions arise
as to its exercise: Who falls under the duty? Which political issues activate the duty? What does
the duty require? Extreme secularists insist that this duty extends to all citizens, ordinary and
official; applies to all political issues regardless of content; and requires that all religious reasons
be bracketed. For instance, Robert Audi counsels the complete privatization of religious faith as
a necessary condition for exercising civic responsibility. He insists that citizens bracket their
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religious motives as well as religious language in deliberating about legislation.25 These
sentiments are echoed by the Muslim secularist Lahouri Addi: “It is necessary to show how
political modernity is incompatible with the public character of religion and how modernity is
built on the depoliticization of religion.”26
A more moderate secularist might question the extreme requirement that ordinary citizens
as well as parliamentarians debate and deliberate in accordance with such a demanding notion of
public reason. One might also question applying the requirement to all policy debates regardless
of their relevance to basic rights. Finally, one might dismiss the need to bracket religious
motivations along with religious arguments. Addressing the issue of application, Rawls accepts
the civility of religious argumentation in justifying policies that do not touch on constitutional
freedoms or that only expand rather than restrict such freedoms. But debates over obscenity and
hate speech (not to mention Indonesia’s blasphemy law) illustrate that the distinction between
constitutional and non-constitutional, freedom-restricting and freedom-enhancing, policies is
hard to draw in practice. Virtually every form of expressive behavior can be interpreted as
politically meaningful or provocative and harmful. Robust free speech potentially undermines
the equal protection of some group(s), but efforts to control for the harmful effects of expressive
behavior directly or indirectly infringe on constitutional liberty.
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The difficulty in distinguishing kinds of speech and speech regulation is made even
harder in the case before us. Habermas and Rawls acknowledge that religious speech and thought
are particularly recalcitrant to bracketing when it comes to things that matter most to people.
Along with other relatively unquestioned comprehensive belief commitments, religion provides
an authoritative anchor for deep moral convictions that cannot be acquired through science or
other forms of practical thinking. These thinkers note the capacity of utopian religious imagery
to expand our secular thinking about social justice and the unique dignity of the human person,
as exemplified, for instance, in the American movement to abolish slavery. This belief in the
importance of utopian, faith-based values in anchoring civil society also informs Soroush’s
notion of “religious democracy,” which he opposes to the corrosive libertarianism of neo-liberal
capitalism. For Soroush, democracy implies “respect for the will of the majority and the rights of
others, justice, sympathy, and mutual trust,” not to mention “tolerance in the domain of beliefs”
and “fallibility in the domain of cognition.”27 Democratic societies, he explains, “do not need to
wash their hands of religiosity nor turn their backs on revelation” so long as they “absorb an
adjudicative understanding of religion” based on “collective reason” and public “common
sense.”28 He therefore concludes that, “if the pluralism of secularism makes it suitable for
democracy, the faithful community is a thousand times more suitable for it.”29
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Like Soroush, Habermas and Rawls recognize that citizens in pluralist democracies
should acknowledge the “burdens of judgment,” which Rawls defines as an acknowledgement
of the reasonableness of pluralism, or the impossibility of converting others’ moral consciences
to one’s own way of thinking by means of rational suasion alone. We must acknowledge that
from others’ standpoints our most certain faith commitments are but subjective opinions, and that
consensus on opinions remains at best a desideratum whose fulfillment leads beyond the realm of
public reason.
Reconciling the civic duties of public reason with the legitimacy of religiously motivated
political expression properly qualified by a reasonable acknowledgment of the burdens of
judgment, Rawls and Habermas recommend MES. They allow the civility of robust religious
rhetoric in debating and deliberating within the public sphere while insisting on its eventual
translation into secular argumentation at the level of government. In order to ease the
asymmetrical burden that falls on believers in meeting the requirements of public reason,
Habermas suggests that even non-believers share in the duty to translate religious appeals into
secular arguments.
A number of questions are raised by this proposal. To begin with, reconciling religious
appeal to the demands of pubic reason might not require much, if any translation. For instance,
Martin Luther King’s quotation of the Bible in his “I Have a Dream Speech” - “There is neither
Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there female and male, for you are all one in Jesus
Christ” (Galatians 3:28) - is readily comprehended by believers and non-believers alike as
referencing the inherent dignity of the individual and the universal equality of all. Furthermore,
as I noted earlier, secularization brings in its wake the rationalization of religious language. In
Christian-majority and Muslim-majority countries, the ethical contents of the Abrahamic
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religious tradition (recall the Biblical passage quoted above) have already been translated into
secular ideas, such as the idea of universal human rights. Finally, as the debates surrounding
abortion, gay marriage, euthanasia, cloning, and stem cell research amply attest, advocates of
religiously motivated policies have had little difficulty in finding secular arguments supporting
their positions. These arguments, to be sure, might not express the main reasons why they
advocate a policy. Arguing by conjecture – showing that a position can be justified by appeal to
reasons that are convincing to one’s opponent but not to oneself – need not be as duplicitous and
insincere as it first appears, especially if the arguer announces his or her real (religious) motives
for supporting her position. Perhaps this is all that Rawls and Habermas have in mind when they
talk about translating religious appeals into the secular language of public reason. If that is so,
then not just appeals to religion but appeals to any comprehensive worldview, however secular,
will require translation into a more broadly shared idiom in order to convince others.30
Contrary to Rawls and Habermas, Taylor simply denies that religion poses a special
challenge to secular democracy requiring special vigilance and separation. This challenge would
not be so pressing if one could easily separate faith from reason, as Habermas and Rawls
admonish us to do. But as the preceding discussion has shown, this cannot be done. What
appears reasonable from the standpoint of public reason is invariably shaped by faith-anchored
judgments.
Does that mean that there is little distinction to be drawn between religious and nonreligious faith commitments, as Taylor insists? Habermas mentions that purely religious faith
commitments differ from non-religious faith commitments in several important respects. First,
Taylor, “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition,” pp.50-56.

30

31

they impose themselves on the faithful only through personal revelation and conversion. Second,
they command their fulfillment as a necessary condition for eternal salvation. Third, they
command their fulfillment as the highest and most unconditional commands. 31
The first and third traits mentioned above might not define religious commitments
exclusively. Secular humanists also speak of epiphanies, revelations, and conversion experiences
that explain their complex journey from believer to non-believer. People in general are reluctant
to abandon core beliefs that are acquired more or less unconsciously over time and that have
become deeply ingrained in their personal identities. Having emerged in ineffable experience,
they ineffably color future experience, thereby creating a self-confirming circle of faith
informing reason and vice versa. As for the third defining characteristic, secular faith
commitments, such as the moral duty to protect even strangers from life-threatening mob
persecution, can also command unconditionally, sometimes at great personal sacrifice.
The second trait, however, may seem to be peculiar to religion. The motivations for
hewing to secular commitments appear less powerful than the promise of eternal salvation or the
threat of eternal damnation vouchsafed by religion. It may therefore seem that religiously
convicted people have less incentive to compromise and be persuaded by others for mundane
reasons. Taken to the extreme of fanaticism, they demonize those who oppose them as
emissaries of evil whose arguments must be resisted if not suppressed.
But religion does not have a monopoly on ideological extremism. Fanatics of all stripes
have been willing to sacrifice mundane freedom, happiness, and commonsense for the sake of
intangible rewards. Such fanatics can still speak the language of public reason; at the very least,
J. Habermas, “Dialogue Between Habermas and Taylor,” in The Power of Religion, pp. 61-62.
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they can conjecture how non-believers might be persuaded to agree with them. What they
cannot do is conform themselves to the spirit of public reason.
So both Taylor and Habermas are mistaken; pace Habermas, the challenge to secular
democracy is not that religious appeals resist translation into a secular idiom; pace Taylor, the
challenge to secular democracy is not that particular creeds will contaminate the ideological
neutrality of the state. Rather, the challenge to secular democracy is an unwillingness to be
persuaded by others who might tempt us to compromise our deepest faith commitments. This
undemocratic disposition is not unique to religion; nor is the disposition to demonize others who
disagree with us. Rather, all organized ideological movements whose members display this
disposition pose unique challenges to secular democracy.

Part Four: Islam and Catholicism as Proponents of Secular Democracy

Uncompromising faith commitments, of course, can also be enlisted in the service of promoting
secular democracy. The historical confrontation between the Catholic Church and Western
democracy, however, shows how exposure to religious pluralism and the subsequent need to
compete for acceptance and influence can motivate fundamentalist movements to moderate and
broaden their appeal in a secular direction. Strategic accommodation to secular democracy can
evolve into principled acceptance; the same principles that once seemed so hostile to democracy
can be drawn upon to promote it. This point is supported by the overwhelming number of
predominantly Catholic countries that adopted secular democratic institutions in the last three
decades of the twentieth century. I submit that it is also confirmed by Indonesia’s more recent
turn to secular democracy, in which Islamist parties played a decisive role. I conclude that the
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failure of these parties to temper their Islamic agenda, as evidenced by their unwillingness to
change the blasphemy law, and the failure of the Constitutional Court to apply the law in a way
that does justice to the Ahmadiya, belies principles of democratic pluralism and public reason
that underlie Indonesia’s uniquely religious-secular ethic of pancasila.
As I have mentioned, fear of Catholic fundamentalism provoked an extreme secular
backlash in France and parts of Latin America that had the effect of confirming a self-fulfilling
prophesy. Well into the twentieth century the Church defended positions that were hostile to
liberalism and democracy.32 Critics blamed this illiberalism on the Church’s highly centralized
authoritarian structure and on its intolerance of other faiths, which followed from its stateassured monopoly on moral and religious instruction in many Catholic nations. But this tells only
one side of the story. The Church’s relationship to liberalism and democracy has always been
shaped by its understanding of the threats arrayed against it. Anti-clerical legislation spurred on
by nationalist republican sentiment in Europe and Mexico during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries may have succeeded in forcing the Church to accommodate liberal
democracy up to a point, albeit mainly as an expedient in non-Catholic countries in which it did
not enjoy a monopoly of influence - a fact which explains its reverse accommodation to antiCommunist governments of a virulent Fascist stripe. Only after the Second World War did the
Church desist from seeking hegemony while embracing freedom of religion as an intrinsic

I discuss these positions in “Civility and Legitimacy: The Ambivalent Role of Religion in Transitional
Democracy,” in Democracy, Culture, and Catholicism, ed. M. Schuck (New York: Fordham University
Press, 2014).
32

34

value.33 By the time the Vatican II reform culminated in declaring religious liberty with Pope
Paul VI’s Dignitatis Humanae (1965) – partly under pressure from American Catholics led by
John Courtney Murray and partly out of an evolving understanding of its own natural law
tradition dating back centuries34 - the Church was well positioned to become the chief
champion of human rights and democracy throughout Latin America and Eastern Europe. 35
The Church’s entry into politics was partly motivated by strategic considerations that fell
far short of the principled endorsement of secular democratic ideals that had been emerging with
its continuous re-examination of its own natural law teaching. Nevertheless, these strategic
considerations themselves might have helped motivate the Church to move beyond a modus
vivendi acceptance of democracy to a more principled embrace of it. From a strategic point of
view,36 movements with strong ideological commitments are propelled to moderate their

John XXIV’s encyclical Pacem in Terris affirmed human rights and citizenship participation in
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agendas in order to avoid government suppression, win elections, and develop an organizational
leadership consisting of professionally trained lawyers, economists, and other professionals
capable of proposing and implementing realistic solutions to a wide range of social problems.
Once these movements come to appreciate the reciprocal benefits to themselves and other likeminded movements of political liberalism, they come to endorse secular democracy and political
liberalism for its intrinsic justice, and converge toward an overlapping consensus in grounding
these ideals in the “truth” conveyed by their own incommensurable doctrines.
These factors were evident in the transformation of revolutionary socialist movements in
Europe into moderate social democratic parties in the twentieth century, and they doubtless
influenced the moderation of emergent Christian democratic parties around the same time. Once
again, while it might be tempting to explain this trajectory of ideological moderation as simply
strategic, the Church’s decision to enter democratic political life was also motivated by reflection
on natural law teaching regarding human dignity, social justice, and limited power sharing.37
Samuel Huntington observes that the “third wave” of democratization from 1974 to 1990
was “overwhelmingly a Catholic wave,” with roughly three-quarters of the thirty countries
transitioning to democracy being predominantly Catholic.38 Among the beneficiaries of this wave
were Peru, where the Church took an active role in organizing the urban and rural poor in
accordance with liberation theological precepts while condemning the anti-democratic and antiliberal revolutionary violence of the Shining Path (from the late 80s through the 90s the Church
37
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also condemned the counter-revolutionary violence, authoritarianism, and corruption of the
Garcia and Fujimori governments). Meanwhile, in Lithuania, with a Catholic majority of 81 per
cent, the Church opposed the communist regime by strongly advocating on behalf of liberal
constitutional principles and human rights.
What made the Church’s role as a promoter of liberal democratic reform possible in these
countries? In both Peru and Lithuania the Church was a part of a national identity that had
traditionally stood apart from the state. The willingness of the Church to separate itself from the
state in these countries enabled it to become more accepting of liberal democracy and vice versa
- “twin tolerations” (as Alfred Stepan puts it)39 that vindicate Tocqueville’s insights, made in
reference to American democratic secularism, that church-state separation increases the political
power and prestige of religious associations. Hence, it is not surprising that the Church’s clout in
moving authoritarian regimes toward liberal democracy was strongest where it refused to
accommodate the state (its clout was weakest in countries like Portugal and Spain, where the
Church received privileges in exchange for supporting dictatorship). Thus, given its support for
the former Franco dictatorship, the Spanish Church was in no position to aggressively press its
own religious agenda on divorce and abortion in the public sphere, and instead chose to play a
subdued role in the new democracy. By contrast, in Poland, the Church parlayed its longstanding prestige as chief antagonist to the Communist regime by pushing for privileged legal
recognition within the new constitutional order.
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As my own research on the Peruvian and Lithuanian Churches has shown,40 Catholicism
has become a potent catalyst for democratic secularization when it has asserted its independence
from government while at the same time using its governmental influence cautiously to promote
broadly secular social justice agendas in civil society. The privileged place enjoyed by the
Peruvian Church is partly a function of its independence from the state and partly a function of
its role as chief dispenser of health, welfare, and education. In playing a predominant role in
Peru’s democratic civil society it has had to present both a “public” face, as defender of human
rights, fraternity, national reconciliation, and the common good, as well as a “private” face as
promoter of an orthodox creed that increasingly finds less support among Peruvians, who are
more open to alternative lifestyles. The less favored position enjoyed by the Lithuanian Church,
by contrast, might reflect its relative inability to break out of a narrow sectarian standpoint and
diversify its message so as to embrace broader struggles for social justice in the face of growing
inequalities caused by capitalism.
The case of Indonesia’s democratic revolution presents a contrast to the Lithuanian case,
more strongly resembling the Church’s role in Peru, with its uniquely religious promotion of
secular democracy. In fact Islamic organizations were at the forefront of Indonesia's revolution.
Abdurrahman Wahid, senior Islamic cleric, headed Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization,
The Awakening of Religious Scholars (Nahdlatul Ulama [NU]). Amien Rais, who joined Wahid
in the struggle against Suharto, led the second largest Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, and
helped focus student demands on democracy. While Rais went on to create a new political party,
the National Mandate Party (PAN) that was not Islamist and whose leadership contained non-
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Muslims, Wahid formed his own Islamic political party, the National Awakening Party (PKB),
that expressly rejected the idea of an Islamic state in favor of a religiously pluralistic one. In
keeping with the pluralistic tenor of his party, he joined in an alliance with the secular nationalist
party of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI), which
included secular Muslims, Christians, and non-Muslim minorities. Wahid was subsequently
elected Indonesia’s first president.
Secular public reason was on full display during the transition to the new regime.
Following Suharto’s resignation, groups representing almost all sectors of society endorsed the
establishment of a democratic government. In the 1999 elections it became apparent that Islamic
parties (such as the PKB and PAN) that did not focus on single-issue messages based on political
Islam fared better than those (such as the Crescent Star Party [PBB]) that did (PKB won 12 %
and PAN 7 %, while PBB won only 2%). The message was clear: pious Muslims who
constituted an overwhelming majority of the population were also interested in issues revolving
around any emergent market economy: health, welfare, security, jobs, and basic subsistence.
Those political Islamist parties (such as the Prosperous Justice Party [PKS]) that abandoned
single-issue politics in order to broaden their appeal to moderate and liberal Muslims saw
dramatic improvements in their popularity in the elections of 2004 (from 1.7 to 7.4 %) and 2009.
Another step forward occurred in 2009, when PKS and the United Development Party (PPP)
joined with PAN and PKB to re-elect the government of Yudhoyono, a former army general and
corruption fighter, who is a member of the secular Democratic Party (PD).
The mainstreaming of Islamist parties has had a reciprocal impact on substantive
legislative outcomes. Policies that permit local shari’a ordinances and ban blasphemy are
moderated by the fact that they are often enacted with the support of many secularists. For
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instance, in 2009 Aceh’s legislature passed a “stoning law” based on shari’a that expressly
punished adulterers and other religious offenders. Less publicized was the fact that that this act
was intended as a parting shot by a legislative majority that had just been voted out of office. The
law was vetoed by Aceh’s democratically elected governor, Irwandi Yusuf, himself a pious
Muslim who recently visited Mecca, and has not been taken up by the new legislature. In the
meantime Yusuf has reined in Aceh’s Islamic “police” in his pursuit of social policies revolving
around increased spending on education and welfare and restrictions on logging. Although Yusuf
was voted out of office in 2012 for allowing a palm oil concession in a protected habitat, Aceh’s
legislature continues to demonstrate a commitment to democratic accountability that exhibits a
considerable degree of republican civility on the part of moderate Muslims and all who are
principally concerned about environmental protection and other “universal” issues that transcend
religion.
Apparently, toleration of Islamist organizations within civil society has in large part
induced a corresponding moderation and broadening of Islamist platforms and arguments.
Importantly, even when not prevailing in competitive elections these organizations have
managed to combine strategies for partially fulfilling strictly religious aims, such as the passage
of blasphemy laws, with commitment to republican ideals of civil discourse.41
While human rights advocates have criticized Indonesia’s acceptance of “stealth
Islamization” as an affront to religious freedom and disestablishment, Indonesia’s predominantly
Muslim legislature may eventually moderate its most controversial provision, the blasphemy
law, in accordance with the country’s republican doctrine of pancasila. Combining two Sanskrit
41
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words: panca (five) and sila (principle), the doctrine affirms: (1) the existence of one universal
God; (2) a just and civilized humanity; (3) the unity of Indonesia; (4) democracy guided by the
inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out deliberations among representatives; and (5) social
justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia. These principles were fashioned by President
Sukarno in 1945 as a synthesis of monotheism, socialism, and nationalism and incorporated into
the constitution. Although the first principle has been criticized for excluding polytheism,
atheism, and agnosticism, its scope is secular and universal, providing an ontological foundation
for human rights and social justice oriented toward a common good.
We now see why Indonesia’s highest court stands in violation of the constitution it is
supposed to defend when it fails to protect the religious freedom of minorities, such as the
Ahmadiya.42 Simply put, the constitution’s pancasilan ethos mandates that its provisions be
interpreted in conformity with principles of liberal toleration and republican civility. The
broader lesson to be drawn from this, however, is that Islamist political movements must
relinquish some of their religious platform for the sake of furthering the liberal and republican
ideals inherent in secular democracy. As in the case of Catholicism, this outcome is more likely
to occur within polities wherein multiple religions compete for political influence through
embracing social justice concerns, political culture encourages deliberative compromise and
constitutional power-sharing, and the judiciary aggressively defends freedom of speech and
minority rights.

V. Concluding Remarks: The Ambivalent Role of Religion in Public Life
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Political Catholicism and political Islam have been demonized as impediments to democracy. I
submit that the real threats to democracy have been authoritarian governments and a rapacious
form of global capitalism that has exacerbated social divisions, threatened stable communities,
and weakened the power of popularly elected regimes to care for their neediest citizens. Indeed,
the record shows that moderate religious political movements are especially adept at promoting
democratization and liberalization because of their uncompromising commitment to social
justice. The record does not show, however, that moderate religious reform movements are
more successful at promoting democratization than more militant and perhaps less secular
political movements; for it may be the case that radical movements are less willing than
moderate movements to compromise with corrupt authoritarian regimes that masquerade as
formal democracies.43
Left unmentioned in my account is the enormous literature on the democratic
moderation of Islamist reform movements. In summarizing some of this recent literature, Jillian
Schwedler notes that standard “inclusion-moderation” theories that emphasize the causal priority
of group behavior (strategically motivated political participation) in moderating group ideology
overlook the fact that moderate behavior does not necessarily imply moderate ideology; that
group ideology is as likely to explain group behavior; and that internal group debate on the
compatibility of pluralistic democracy with a group's Islamic commitments is often decisive in
determining whether a group moderates its religious platform. 44 But more important, for that
debate to happen and be resolved to the satisfaction of rank and file membership, charismatic
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leaders who have engaged in public reasoning with representatives of opposing viewpoints must
have already re-imagined the group's Islamic commitments in a way that moves a majority of the
group’s members from a strategic accommodation to pluralist democracy toward a more
principled embrace of it – a conjectural reasoning from Islamic premises that has the potential to
encourage moderate epistemic secularism.
As Andrew Marsh observes in discussing the capacity of moderate Islamic leaders within
Western democracies (such as Tariq Ramadan)45 to conjecture about how Islamic values might
support political liberalism, the absence of any concrete statement of underlying values and
principles in Islamic law opens up a space for Muslims residing in these democracies to
reinterpret Islam’s traditional rule-commanding observance of contracts in accordance with a
social contractarian consent to abide by liberal democratic institutions. 46 Accompanying this
commitment is a commitment to social justice for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, expanding
the community of civil solidarity beyond fellow Muslims to include all those with whom
Muslims are “contractually bound” by ties political, social, and economic. In this way Muslims
learn to view the core social justice values of their own faith as free-standing and faithtranscending– universal, multicultural, and secular. Epistemic secularism in this moderate form
can reconcile a strongly religious background culture to secular institutions and secular politics
in the manner prescribed by political liberalism. It can also foster critical dialog among Muslims
about the meaning of Islamic social values, leading, in turn, to greater civil participation in
democracy (and, conversely, greater democratic moderation of Islamic demands).
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It would be premature to conclude from what I have said above that political Islam can
embrace secular democracy without relinquishing at least some of its power and identity. As our
discussion of the most recent waves of democratization clearly attests, a paradox exists in
enlisting this power and identity in service to a mundane end whose realization would entail its
diminution (or dilution). Unlike purely secular movements that risk life and limb in pursuit of
ending oppression, religious movements that seek justice by realizing God's Kingdom on earth
may seem to have more powerful incentives for doing so, but they may also face greater
challenges in accommodating justice for all.
A secular democracy which incorporates both liberal and civic republican values may be
the best worldly approximation of that Kingdom. That the dignity of the individual instantiated
in the liberal defense of human rights can degenerate into a nihilistic worship of unrestrained
individual self-assertion unless coupled with a civic republican devotion to justice and a common
good conception of the rule of law has been a mainstay of democratic theory for over three
hundred years. Both Weber and Durkheim warned us of this secular danger, as do moderate
Muslim secularists like Soroush, who counsel against equating democracy with a strongly
secular, morally eviscerated liberalism.47 We know from our experience with the secular
“political theologies” of the twentieth century – nationalism, fascism, and communism - that this
danger can provoke a fundamentalist backlash. A “formal democracy” that does nothing more
than protect against government tyranny by delivering political life over to powerful interests
and economic aggregation of selfish preferences is fertile soil for its cultivation.
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Democracy premised on the dignity of the individual and the common good must
encompass respect for public reason and the rule of law. The Indonesian ideal of civic
deliberation ensconced in pancasila encompasses both aims. In upholding the possibility of
achieving consensus on a common good, this ideal expresses a religious belief in the
unconditional dignity of the individual and of a higher justice, which it opposes to the
divisiveness and inequality of a market-based democracy ruled by selfish preferences. In
supplementing personal revelation with rational dialogue as a method for discovering this good,
the ideal leaves open the possibility that consensus may not be reached, that something like an
agreement to disagree, coupled with an agreement to compromise on some issues and tolerate
individual differences of opinion, may be inevitable. The historical confrontation of Catholicism
and democracy in the last century, no less than the parallel confrontation of Islam and democracy
in the present one, might seem to suggest that compromise invariably resolves itself in the form
of a strategic modus vivendi, in which toleration of the other is suffered out of necessity rather
than embraced for its own sake. Such may be the case initially, but the stories told here offer
hope for a more civil resolution.
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